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ABSTRACT 
In 2004, Das, Saxena and Gulati proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme which 
has many advantage such as no verifier table, user freedom to choose and change password and so on. 
However the subsequent papers have shown that this scheme is completely insecure and vulnerable to 
many attacks. Since then many schemes with improvements to Das et al’s scheme has been proposed but 
each has its pros and cons. Recently Yan-yan Wang et al. have proposed a scheme to overcome security 
weaknesses of Das et al.’s scheme. However this scheme too is vulnerable to various security attacks such 
as password guessing attack, masquerading attack, denial of service attack.     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In order to prevent the invasion of privacy and solve security problems, a remote user would 
need to provide proof to a system that he/she is a legitimate user before he/she logs onto the 
remote system. There are many methods proposed to verify the legitimacy of a remote user such 
as password, fingerprint, typing sequence, and so forth. Among them, password based remote 
user authentication is extensively used and easily implemented to authenticate a legitimate user. 
In 1981, Lamport [3] proposed a password based authentication scheme that could authenticate 
remote users over a insecure channel. Since than many schemes [6, 7, 8, 9] have been proposed 
to improve security, efficiency, and cost. 
In 2004, Das, Saxena and Gulati proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme [2] which has many advantage such as no verifier table, user freedom to 
choose and change password and so on. However the subsequent papers [4,5] have shown that 
this scheme is completely insecure and vulnerable to many attacks. Since then many 
schemes[1,4] with improvements to Das et al’s scheme has been proposed but each has its pros 
and cons. Recently Yan-yan Wang et al. [1] have proposed a scheme to overcome security 
weaknesses of Das et al.’s scheme.  
However in this paper we state that this scheme too is vulnerable to few security attacks 
such as password guessing attack, masquerading attack, denial of service attack.     
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  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present review of Yan-yan 
Wang et al.’s scheme. The section 3 describes cryptanalysis of Yan-yan Wang et al.’s scheme. 
And finally some concluding comments are included in the last section.   
 
2. Review OF YAN-YAN WANG ET AL.’S SCHEME 
The scheme consists of four phases, the registration phase, the login phase, the verification 
phase and password change phase. The notations used in the scheme are as follows: 
 
U  The user 
PW   The password of U 
ID  The identity of U 
S  The remote server 
h(.)  A one-way hash function 
⊕  Bitwise XOR operation 
→  A common channel 
═=>  A secure channel 
A → B: M A sends M to B through common channel 
A ═=> B: M A sends M to B through secure channel 
 
2.1. Registration Phase 
The user Ui sends the registration request to the remote server S: 
 
1) Ui submits IDi to S 
 
2) S computes: 
 
        Ni = h(PWi) ⊕ h(x) ⊕ IDi 
 
     Where x is secret of remote server, PWi is the password of Ui chosen by S. 
 
3) S personalizes the smartcard with the parameters [h(.), Ni, y ], where y is the remote 
server’s secret  number stored in each registered user’s smartcard. 
 
4) S ═=> Ui: PWi and smartcard. 
 
2.2. Login Phase  
When a user wants to login the remote server, he/she inserts the smart card to the terminal and 
keys the identity IDi and the password PWi , then the smartcard performs the following steps: 
 
1) Computes dynamic ID: 
 
   CIDi = h(PWi) ⊕ h(NiΘyΘ T) ⊕ IDi 
      
Where T is the current date and time. 
 
2) Ui → S: IDi, CIDi,Ni,T 
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2.3. Verification Phase 
When the remote server S receives the request (IDi,CIDi,Ni,T) at time T’ , S verifies as: 
 
1) checks the validity of time interval, if T’ – T ≤ ∆T holds, S accepts the login request of 
Ui, otherwise the login request will be rejected, where ∆T is valid time interval. 
 
2) S computes:  
 
h’(PWi) = CIDi ⊕ h(NiΘyΘ T) ⊕ IDi 
 
3) and computes 
 
IDi’ = Ni ⊕ h’(PWi) ⊕ h(x)  
 
and verifies whether it is equal to IDi in the login request of Ui. If it does not hold S rejects the 
login request of Ui, otherwise accepts it. Then S computes a’ using the result of step 2. 
 
a’ = h (h’(PWi) ⊕ y ⊕ T’) 
 
4) S sends (a’,T) to Ui. 
 
Upon receiving the reply message (a’,T) at time T*, Ui verifies as: 
 
5) Ui checks whether T* – T’ ≤ ∆T, if it does then Ui computes a = h(h(PWi) ⊕ y ⊕ T’ ) , and 
compares it with the received a’ , if it holds, Ui confirms  that S is valid. 
 
2.4. Password Change Phase  
When the user wants to change the password, he/she inserts the smartcard into the terminal 
device, keys the password PWi and request to change the password to new one PWnew, then the 
smartcard computes:  
 
Ni* = Ni ⊕ h(PWi) ⊕ h(PWnew),  
 
and replaces the Ni with the new Ni*, password gets changed. 
3. CRYPTANALYSIS OF YAN-YAN WANG ET AL.’S SCHEME 
In this section we will show that Yan-yan Wang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to masquerade 
attack, password guessing attack, denial of service attack. Although tamper resistant smartcard 
widely assumed in most of the authentication scheme, but such an assumption is difficult in 
practice. Many researchers have shown that the secret stored in a smartcard can be breached by 
analyzing the leaked information or by monitoring the power consumption [10,11]. An attacker 
can extract secret y stored in the Ui’s smartcard either by stealing the smartcard or by 
registering to the server (as each registered user has same value of y stored in their smartcard). 
 
3.1. Password guessing attack 
Assuming that the attacker has extracted the secret y from Ui’s smartcard and also he/she has 
the intercepted parameters, CIDi, Ni, T and IDi. Then the attacker can proceed as follows: 
 
h(PWi)= CIDi ⊕ h(Ni ⊕ y ⊕ T) ⊕ IDi 
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Now attacker can guess different passwords until the hash value of the guessed password 
matches with h(PWi) computed by the attacker. 
 
3.2. User Masquerade Attack 
In the second step of registration phase S computes: 
 
Ni = h(PWi) ⊕ h(x) ⊕ IDi 
 
The attacker can now extract h(x) from Ni by using h(PWi) computed in ‘A’  : 
 
h(x) = h(PWi) ⊕ Ni ⊕ IDi 
 
now attacker can calculate new Ni* with his/her choosen password PW* as follows: 
 
Ni* =  h(PWi*) ⊕ h(x) ⊕ IDi 
 
Attacker can now create and send a forged login request to the remote server S, without 
knowing the original password: 
 
CIDi* = h(PWi*) ⊕ h(Ni* ⊕ y ⊕ T*) ⊕ IDi 
 
where T* is fresh time stamp. 
 
Attacker sends to the server S, {CIDi*,Ni*,T*, IDi}. Upon receiving login request Server S 
successfully verifies validity of timestamp T *and identity IDi, hence accepting the request. 
 
3.3. Server Masquerade Attack 
The attacker can masquerade server by using the h(PWi) computed in ‘ A ‘ and : 
 
a* = h (h(PWi) ⊕ y ⊕ T” )  
 
Attacker then sends (a*,T” ) to Ui, which the user successfully verifies. 
 
3.4. Denial of Service Attack 
The password change phase of Yan-yan Wang et al.’s scheme is same as that of Das et al.’s 
scheme and it has a serious weakness. The password change phase does not verify whether the 
input old password matches with the original password. An attacker can use Ui’s smartcard in 
his absence and can invoke password change phase by inputting an arbitrary password PW’ in 
place of original password PWi along with a new password PWnew. Then the smartcard 
updates Ni without verifying the old password as follows: 
 
 Ni* = Ni ⊕ h(PW’ ) ⊕ h(PWnew) 
 
That will result in some arbitrary value Ni*.Now the original user Ui can not log onto the 
remote server even by using his correct password as the Ni has been changed to some arbitrary 
value. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we briefly reviewed Yan-yan Wang et al.’s scheme and shown that this improved 
scheme too is vulnerable to various security attacks such as password guessing attack, user 
masquerade attack, server masquerade attack, denial of service attack. In addition to this the 
password change phase updates smartcard parameter even if wrong password is given as input. 
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